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INTERACTIVE PRE-CLEARANCE DEVELOPMENT 
KAREEM U. CRAYTON* 
Congress spent relatively little time in 1965 discussing the “special 
provisions” in the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”), the federal law responsible for 
America’s “Second Reconstruction.”1  Enacted to enforce the constitutional 
rights to racial equality guaranteed by the Fifteenth Amendment, the VRA 
dealt a final blow to the segregationist program of denying black voters access 
to the ballot in the South.2  The law is often credited for prompting the 
emergence of minority political participation and representation both in the 
South and throughout the country.3 
The most significant of these special provisions is contained in Section 
Five of the VRA, which mandates that certain state and local governments seek 
and obtain federal permission or “pre-clearance” before changing their election 
rules and practices.4  The provision radically shifts the traditional balance 
 
* Associate Professor of Law & Political Science, University of Southern California.  A.B. 
Harvard College, JD/PhD Stanford University.  Special thanks to both Jeremy Lawrence and 
Alexa Lawson-Remer for their very helpful assistance in researching this piece. 
 1. See Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act 
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577 (codified in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973bb-1 (2006)); J. MORGAN KOUSSER, The Voting 
Rights Act and Two Reconstructions in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING 
RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE 135, 135 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds. 1992). 
 2. See generally VLADIMIR ORLANDO KEY, SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION 
(University of Tennessee Press 1984) (1949); STEVE LAWSON, RUNNING FOR FREEDOM: CIVIL 
RIGHTS AND BLACK POLITICS IN AMERICA SINCE 1941 56 (Temple University Press 1991). 
 3. See generally QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS 
ACT, 1965 – 1990 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Groffman, eds., Princeton University Press 
1994) (offering an empirical assessment of state level political advancement for minority 
communities as a result of the VRA’s adoption and enforcement). 
 4. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 5, 79 Stat. 437 (1965); see also U.S. 
CONST. amend. XV (prohibiting states from "deny[ing] or abridg[ing] the right of any citizen of 
the United States to vote on account of race or color").  I describe the pre-clearance remedy at 
greater length in later sections, but it is helpful to speak with some level of precision at this stage.  
The term “pre-clearance” refers to the special remedy in the Voting Rights Act that “freezes” 
existing voting laws in certain state or local jurisdictions with especially unfavorable records of 
race discrimination in the electoral arena.  In order to make changes to existing law, the 
jurisdiction must receive permission from the Justice Department or the U.S. District Court in 
Washington D.C.  In either case, the state must show that its proposed change does not have the 
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between state and federal power, yet this issue appeared only infrequently in 
the congressional hearings and floor debates on the VRA.5  Public frustration 
over the violence against civil rights marchers and the state evasion of federal 
court orders by the states prompted outcries for swift passage of a tough, 
effective voting rights bill.6  Amidst such a widespread call for strong federal 
action, questions about the bill’s impact on federalism and state sovereignty 
were quickly lost.7 
From its relatively unassuming origins, the pre-clearance provision today 
has emerged as an important – and controversial – part of the VRA.  Since 
1990, the remedy has been the source of most voting rights litigation in the 
Supreme Court.8  In its next term, the Supreme Court will consider the 
constitutionality of the pre-clearance remedy as the latest episode in its 
discourse on congressional enforcement authority under the Civil Rights 
Amendments.9 
As the most recent renewal hearings in 2006 show, many view this 
development as an unfavorable one.10  They bemoan the remedy’s 
transformation from a supporting part of the original enactment into an all-
purpose tool of federal enforcement today.11  According to their account, the 
 
purpose and will not have the effect of denying or diluting the right to vote on account of race or 
color. 
 5. CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (1985). 
 6. See, e.g., United States v. Alabama, 171 F. Supp. 720 (M.D. Ala. 1959); J.W. PELTASON, 
FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 
(Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. 1961) (describing the social and political isolation experienced by 
a subset of southern federal judges who sided against southern states in civil rights cases). 
 7. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Special Message to the Congress: The American Promise 
(Mar. 15, 1965) in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES  281–84 (1966). 
 8. See S. REP. NO. 109-295, pt. IIB (2006); H.R. REP. NO. 109-478, at 18, 36–44, 52–53 
(2006). 
 9. Bartlett v. Strickland, 649 S.E.2d 364 (N.C. 2007), cert. granted 76 U.S.L.W. 3289 (U.S. 
Mar. 17, 2008) (No. 07-689); see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Kimel v. 
Fla. Bd of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Fla. 
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (2000); Bd. of Tr. 
of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Pamela Karlan, Two Section Twos and Two 
Section Fives: Voting Rights and Remedies After Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L.REV. 725, 730–31 
(1998). 
 10. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996) (rejecting Texas’ redistricting plan as an 
unconstitutional racial gerrymander); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) (rejecting 
congressional redistricting predominantly motivated by race in Georgia); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 
630 (1993) (finding that the Constitution generally forbids redistricting that is predominantly 
driven by race); Nancy K. Bannon, The Voting Rights Act: Over the Hill at Age 30?, 22 HUM. 
RTS. Q. 10 (1995). 
 11. See, e.g, Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 893 (1994) (J. Thomas concurring) (noting the 
“sea change that has occurred in the application and enforcement” of the remedy); ABIGAIL 
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purpose of pre-clearance was to supplement the litigation remedy outlined in 
Section Two of the VRA.12  The more traditional brand of civil rights litigation 
was supposed to be the “sword” to dismantle ongoing racial discrimination in 
elections, while the pre-clearance review process served as an administrative 
“shield” to stop prospective efforts to discriminate.13  Fashioning pre-clearance 
as an offensive weapon departs from its initial conception as a narrow, 
temporary response to election-related race discrimination.14  Today, pre-
clearance now requires states to adopt institutional reforms that unreasonably 
interfere with party competition and state sovereignty—which greatly exceeds 
Congress’ vision.15 
That the pre-clearance regime has transformed during its four decades of 
enforcement can hardly be disputed.  But this article claims that the 
aforementioned “pre-clearance run amok” claim is quite mistaken for two 
reasons.  First, the changes in the pre-clearance system did not happen by 
chance.  In fact, these changes have resulted from the careful and measured 
choices of two sets of political actors—Congress and the judiciary.  As these 
two groups repeatedly reshaped this remedy in response to new kinds of 
election problems that emerged, their revisions have significantly redefined the 
pre-clearance remedy.16 
A second and more critical flaw of the criticism is its notion that pre-
clearance has uniformly expanded over time.  The true story of this remedy’s 
development is a far more dynamic and complex tale.  As this article will 
explain, only certain aspects of the pre-clearance regime have broadened in 
their application during the last forty years.17  Today, the remedy covers more 
parts of the country and applies to a larger share of election laws and 
procedures than it did in 1965.  But the key component of this remedy—its 
standard for reviewing changes in election law—has followed a markedly 
different path.  The central element of the remedy has become decidedly more 
limited in its application.18 
In advancing these points, this article relies on observations from the field 
of political science to help explain why the evolution of pre-clearance has 
 
THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT? AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS 
(Harvard University Press 1987). 
 12. THERNSTROM, supra note 11, at 137. 
 13. Id. at 190. 
 14. Id. at 190–91. 
 15. See Holder, 512 U.S. at 892 (J. Thomas concurring) (“[W]e have immersed the federal 
courts in a hopeless project of weighing questions of political theory—questions judges must 
confront to establish a benchmark concept of an ‘undiluted’ vote.”). 
 16. Scott Gluck, Congressional Reaction to Judicial Construction of Section Five of the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 337, 384 (1996). 
 17. See discussion infra Part III. 
 18. Id. 
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followed such a complex path.  Put simply, this provision is the product of 
what may be called an interactive statutory construction – the involvement of 
both Congress and the courts to provide meaning to the words in the law.  The 
current meaning of the statute results from the roles that both Congress and the 
courts play in providing meaning to the text.  In constructing the remedy, the 
interaction between the two branches has both clarified and confused key 
elements of the provision.  As a result, parts of the remedy have become more 
expansive in their application while others have become decidedly less so. 
The article proceeds as follows: Part I discusses the political science model 
of interactive statutory construction used to understand the role judges play in 
interpreting statutes. Part II lays out the evolution of the various components of 
the pre-clearance remedy using the interactive model as a guide.  Finally, Part 
III discusses the impact of the interactive development for pre-clearance before 
briefly concluding that the institutional of the Court helps to explain why one 
part of the remedy has followed a distinct path over time. 
I.  POLITICAL SCIENCE AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
One reason that construing statutes poses a conceptual challenge is that 
multiple institutions contribute to the enterprise.19  Scholars of political science 
and law often recognize that a statute’s meaning depends on the actions of 
multiple officials.20  Most often, Congress begins by selecting the words 
contained in statutes commanding citizens to do (or not do) certain things.  
Those words hold meanings, some of which Congress explicitly defines when 
it drafts and amends the text itself.21  But the particular meanings that Congress 
prefers may not take effect without the consent of the President, who may veto 
proposed meanings that he finds objectionable.22  Even when both of these 
actors share a view about what a given enactment means, the consistent 
 
 19. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 11–14 (1986); HENRY M. HART JR. & ALBERT M. 
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 
(William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey eds., 1994); WILLIAM D. POPKIN, STATUTES IN 
COURT: THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1999); ANTONIN SCALIA, 
A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 13 (Amy Guttman ed., 1998); 
Randal N. Graham, A Unified Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 23 Statute L. Rev. 91 (2002). 
 20. For a critique of the political science approach to interpretation, see Pamela Karlan & 
Daniel Ortiz, Negative Political Theory, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1691 (1995). 
 21. SCALIA, supra note 19 at, xii, 3; Note, Looking It Up: Dictionaries and Statutory 
Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1438 (1994). 
 22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (providing that “[e]very Bill which shall have passed the 
House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the 
President of the United States” who may veto the bill).  See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & 
John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523 (1992) (arguing that legislators’ 
awareness that the presidential veto has the power to end the legislative process, subject only to 
their ability to override a presidential veto with a supermajority vote, profoundly influences the 
legislative process and the dynamics of bargaining and deliberation). 
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application and interpretation of the statute depends on the work of executive 
agencies and courts when they confront problems regarding statutory 
meaning.23 
In their work on strategic statutory interpretation, Ferejohn and Weingast 
explore the judicial role in interpreting statutes.  They argue that any judge’s 
effort at construction poses “a practical tension between democracy and the 
rule of law.”24  Because its members typically focus more on re-election than 
on governance, Congress as an institution does not often ensure that legislation 
follows a well-ordered, uniform set of rules.25  This is especially true where a 
statute undergoes several amendments or reconciliation between both 
legislative chambers.  As a result, the judiciary must make sense of ambiguous 
(or even contradictory) statutory language to resolve legal disputes when they 
arise.26 
For their part, judges select interpretive tools partly based on their own 
views about legislative power.27  They may privilege the words of the statute 
(as textualists might prefer),28 or they may look beyond the words to find clues 
about meaning from the enacting legislature (the desire of many intentionalists 
and some purposivists).29  Ferejohn and Weingast provide an assessment of 
these interpretative modes based on their implications for democratic efficacy.  
Importantly, the authors note that some of the court’s choices can actually 
disrupt the way that Congress manages social policy through deliberative law-
making.30 
To promote greater efficacy in Congress, the authors claim, judicial 
interpretation ought to acknowledge this key link between the branches.  They 
model interpretation as a kind of sequential interaction—a series of strategic 
choices to construe a statute in anticipation of (and sometimes in reaction to) 
the decisions of the other branch.31  Using the Civil Rights Act’s development 
as an example, the authors show that these institutions can work in concert or 
 
 23. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical 
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990). 
 24. John Ferejohn & Barry Weingast, Limitation of Statutes: Strategic Statutory 
Interpretation, 80 GEO. L. J. 565, 570 (1992). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty 
of the judicial department to say what the law is.  Those who apply the rule to particular cases, 
must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.”). 
 27. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILLIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, 
LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETION (2000). 
 28. Nicholas Zeppos, Justice Scalia's Textualism: The “New” New Legal Process, 12 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1597, 1614–15 (1991). 
 29. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 13, 27–38 
(1994); CASS SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS DO (2001). 
 30. Ferejohn & Weingast, supra note 24 at 567. 
 31. Id. 
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at cross-purposes.  Just as “Congress is not always silent on how its actions 
should be interpreted” by a potentially hostile judiciary or later Congress, the 
authors also note that “courts have shaped their decisions in anticipation of 
adverse reaction . . . from Congress.”32 Because sharply departing from 
acceptable interpretations risks hasty law-making by Congress and a cost of 
unpredictability in the law, a the authors find that a strategic court should adopt 
interpretations that do not disturb the preferences of the legislative majority 
that enacted the bill. 
II.  INTERACTIVE PRE-CLEARANCE DEVELOPMENT 
This more dynamic approach to understanding statutory development 
provides a helpful way of understanding the evolutionary experience of the 
VRA’s pre-clearance remedy.  As with the Civil Rights Act, Congress and the 
Supreme Court have refined the application of the pre-clearance remedy since 
its inception.  But their involvement in this particular project has been selective 
and, at times, has worked at cross-purposes.  The discussion below suggests 
that this relationship has differed for different aspects of the pre-clearance 
regime. 
In place today are expansive conceptions of the remedy’s “coverage” and 
“submission” components, which the branches have mutually reinforced in 
their statutory interpretations over time.  On matters of where and when federal 
oversight applies, Congress and the Court have entrenched a broad, expansive 
view of the remedy.  There are few exceptions to the general rule that 
“coverage” applies fully in places that are designated by Section Four of the 
VRA. 
Similarly, there is shared institutional understanding on applying a robust 
meaning to the requirement that covered jurisdictions submit changes in law 
related to voting.  Judicial and legislative constructions involving this element 
have reinforced each other, with each often explicitly citing its counterpart’s 
pronouncements to confirm its own reasoning.  Consequently, there is great 
clarity in the statute about which jurisdictions are subject to the pre-clearance 
requirement and which kinds of new enactments require federal review. 
Compared to these two elements of the remedy, the legal standard for 
authorizing pre-clearance changes has followed a markedly different path.  
While the provision’s geographical scope and subject-matter limitation have 
been construed in very similar ways, the legal standard of review has become a 
more contested concept.  In its current incarnation, the substantive standard for 
review now prohibits very few types of discriminatory changes.  As the 
Supreme Court has most recently described it, the standard only bans a state 
change whose purpose or effect is “retrogressive” in nature.  But the definition 
 
 32. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2008] INTERACTIVE PRE-CLEARANCE DEVELOPMENT 325 
of retrogression itself provides little guidance about the kind information 
relevant in this analysis. 
In contrast to their cooperative effort to define the other features, Congress 
and the Court have engaged in a more combative relationship with this part of 
the remedy.  After the initial enactment, Congress did not specifically reaffirm 
its original view of the pre-clearance standard as it did with the other parts of 
the remedy.  In the absence of an explicit endorsement of its earlier views 
about the pre-clearance standard, the judiciary was free to develop 
understandings of its own.  Starting in the mid 1970s, the Court began 
outlining its own conception of how the review standard ought to function.  
That narrow construction of this provision, which largely supports the 
judiciary’s effort to limit the application of voting rights pre-clearance, largely 
prevails today. 
A. The Scope of Pre-clearance 
Two distinct elements in the pre-clearance provision define the scope of 
this remedy: the places where the pre-clearance remedy applies (“coverage”) 
and the types of local enactments requiring federal review and approval (the 
“submission” requirement).  With respect to legal questions about both of these 
issues, the Court and Congress have interpreted the statute in an expansive 
manner to assure that the pre-clearance remedy has broad application. 
1. When is a Jurisdiction “Covered”? 
Both the legislative and judicial constructions of the pre-clearance remedy 
have promoted an expansive view about which jurisdictions in the country are 
covered.  Congress has approved several amendments to lengthen the remedy’s 
geographic reach, and the Court has turned back various efforts to reverse this 
trend.  This result is unsurprising, since the statutory text itself says a great 
deal about which parts of the country the law targets.33  The triggering formula 
in Section Four uses objective, voting-related factors to guide this decision.  
For a state or local entity to be designated for pre-clearance, federal officials 
must find two things: (1) that a state’s laws contain one of a specified list of 
voting prerequisites and (2) that registration and participation rates in certain 
 
 33. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a) (2000).  As scholars have often noted about the drafting of this 
provision, the Justice Department and Congress worked very carefully to designate those states 
where these special obligations would apply.  Their purposeful exclusion of politically sensitive 
states like Texas (home to President Johnson), Tennessee, and Arkansas (both represented by 
powerful Democratic Senators) from the oversight regime suggests that party politics played 
some role in developing the provision.  Nonetheless, the facially neutral criteria that drove the 
formula offered an objective basis for enforcing the remedy to the fullest extent.  Chandler 
Davidson The Voting Rights Act: A Brief History, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING 17 
(Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992). 
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national elections fall below a threshold percentage of the voting age 
population. 
Soon after the VRA became law, the Supreme Court in South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach endorsed this method of defining the remedy’s geographic scope.34  
The majority specifically rejected arguments that Congress had exceeded its 
authority by infringing on the sovereignty of selected states.  Noting the law’s 
goal to “banish the blight of discrimination in voting,” the Court found that 
Section Four reasonably targeted parts of the country where violations 
occurred most often—which, in 1965, was the Deep South.35  These states had 
maintained a record of “intransigence, foot dragging, and sometimes overt 
hostility” to court orders and litigation, which contributed to low levels of 
registration and turnout.36  In light of this evidence, a geographically specific 
remedy was a reasonable and permissible solution.  The approval of both the 
ends and means of the law marked an important consensus with Congress 
about limiting the remedy to places where registration and voting problems 
were most severe. 
The Court’s favorable view of the triggering formula in turn supported 
later efforts by Congress to broaden pre-clearance coverage in later 
amendments.  Congress reworked Section Four’s framework in 1970 and 1975 
by updating the threshold measures of voter participation, based on more 
current national elections.37  As a result, these modifications of the trigger 
brought new areas of the country into the pre-clearance system.  The most 
significant substantive change occurred in 1975, when Congress identified 
English language-based rules and procedures as pre-requisite devices that 
could trigger pre-clearance coverage.38  The targeted jurisdictions captured by 
this amendment were mostly in the South and Southwest, extending the 
remedy’s geographic reach into new regions with different racial minority 
groups.39  With Katzenbach’s endorsement of relying upon neutral factors to 
 
 34. 383 U.S. 301 (1966). 
 35. Id. at 304. 
 36. Id. at 311–13. 
 37. See Voting Rights Act Extension: Hearings Before Subcomm. Number 5 of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., H.R. Rep. No. 91-397, at 3280 (1970); Joint View of Ten Members 
of the Judiciary Committee Relating to Extension of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 91st Cong. 
5517-5520 (1970) [hereinafter Joint View]; S. Rep. No. 94-295, at 777 (1975).  The Act’s 
coverage provision expanded to parts of New York, Arizona, California, Wyoming, Connecticut, 
New Hampshire, Maine, and Massachusetts. 
 38. Joint View, supra note 37 at 5517-20.  The 1970 statute based coverage on participation 
during the 1968 elections, while the 1975 extension added a threshold based on state-by-state 
participation during the 1972 elections. 
 39. See Davidson, supra note 33, at 34–37. 
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guide the “coverage” designation, few in Congress doubted the propriety of 
refashioning the formula to add to the roster of “covered” jurisdictions.40 
This is not to say that developing the coverage formula eliminated all 
possible ambiguities.  Several cases before the Court tested the extent to which 
coverage should apply to a targeted jurisdiction in special circumstances.  But 
even when it was invited to curtail the provision’s scope, the Court has largely 
followed Congress’ lead in promoting a broad approach to pre-clearance 
coverage.  An examination of two categories of cases—those involving the 
application of the provision to political subdivisions and those applying 
coverage to political parties—illustrate this point well. 
In United States v. Sheffield, the Court made clear that “all entities having 
power over any aspect of the electoral process” in a covered state were subject 
to the pre-clearance review system.41  The defendant jurisdiction in this case 
was a city that adopted an at-large system for local elections through a 
referendum.42  Though it did not oppose the referendum, the DOJ lodged pre-
clearance objections to specific elements of the proposed election change.43  A 
U.S. District Court dismissed a lawsuit to enforce the federal objection, 
holding that Sheffield was not a “covered” jurisdiction in terms of the VRA.44  
That legal conclusion turned on a reading of language in Section 14(c) of the 
VRA, which arguably limited pre-clearance coverage to those subdivisions and 
local entities that controlled voter registration.45 
On review, Justice Brennan rejected this construction and found that the 
Section 14(c) distinction was “completely irrelevant to the Act’s purposes.”46  
The lower court’s “crippling” interpretation made little sense in light of 
Congress’ broad statutory objectives.47  The Court’s reasoning centered instead 
on Section Four, whose terms are referenced in Section Five.48  Section Four 
imposed its duties on States as entire territories, “not just [on those] county 
governments or units of local government that register voters.”49  Nothing in 
the triggering provision suggested that coverage depended upon a jurisdiction’s 
control over the registration process.  Therefore, the best way of reading 
Section Five, which borrows from Section Four, was that it enjoyed the same 
reach.50  The competing construction, the Court continued, would have created 
 
 40. Joint View, supra note 37 at 5517-20. 
 41. 435 U.S. 110 (1978). 
 42. Id. at 114. 
 43. Id. at 114–15. 
 44. Id. at 117–18. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Sheffield, 435 U.S. at 130. 
 48. Id. at 120. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 123. 
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incentives for states to evade federal review and that approach would run 
counter to the entire pre-clearance system.51  If the lower court was correct, 
then local governments would be free to adopt the very same discriminatory 
rules that Alabama’s legislature clearly could not.52  Finally, the Court made 
clear that this interpretation was warranted since Congress had effectively 
ratified this view by extending the remedy on two occasions following the 
decision in Katzenbach.53 
The Court interpreted coverage expansively in the context of pre-clearance 
“bailout” as well.54  City of Rome v. United States is perhaps better known for 
upholding the constitutionality of the 1975 amendments to Section Five, but 
the Court’s discussion about the scope of Section Four is noteworthy for 
present purposes.55  The specific issue was whether a city located within a 
covered state could independently excuse itself from pre-clearance.56  Noting 
that Sheffield did not establish that a city was the same as a “state” for pre-
clearance purposes, the majority found evidence in the 1975 legislative 
hearings on the VRA showing that bailout was conceived as an all-or-nothing 
proposition.57  During these sessions, both the House and Senate made clear 
that localities could not pursue bailout on their own.58  In light of these 
statements, the Court found no merit to the city’s plea for relief.  So long as the 
state remained covered by the pre-clearance regime, its subsidiary units did as 
well.59 
Aside from extending coverage to state and local governments, the Court 
has found private entities subject to the remedy in their administration of 
elections.  Morse v. Republican Party of Virginia recognized that parties can 
 
 51. Id. at 124–25. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Sheffield, 435 U.S. at 135 (“Here, the ‘slumbering army’ of Congress was twice 
‘aroused,’ and on each occasion it re-enacted the Voting Rights Act and manifested its view that § 
5 covers all cities in designated jurisdictions”) (footnote omitted). 
 54. “Bailout” refers to a procedure allowing a covered jurisdiction to avoid pre-clearance by 
bringing a declaratory judgment action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia and 
proving that it has not engaged in discrimination for a designated length of time.  See 42 U.S.C. § 
1973b(b). 
 55. 446 U.S. 156, 167–68 (1980). 
 56. See S. Rep. No. 417 at 57, 44.  This decision was effectively mooted by Congress’ pre-
clearance extensions in 1982, but the change was reflective of a new policy rather than a rejection 
of the Court’s misinterpretation.  In any event, the case is important in that it offers evidence of 
the Court’s adherence to a broad approach to interpreting the coverage component of pre-
clearance. 
 57. City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 167–68; see Sheffield, 435 U.S. at 128 (“Because the 
designated jurisdiction in this case is a State, we need not consider the question of how § 5 
applies when a political subdivision is the designated entity”). 
 58. City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 169. 
 59. Id. at 191–92. 
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wield power in ways that raise pre-clearance concerns.60  The party in that case 
charged a special fee for all delegates in its nominating conventions, which 
substituted for primary elections.61  In explaining why the party fell within the 
scope of the Act, the Court referred to an historical analogue—the infamous 
“White Primary” cases.62  The principle from those cases is that political 
regulation is core a state function that is subject to Constitutional commands, 
whether the state itself or its agents issue the rules.63  Since this event was the 
crucial step in choosing officials, for example, Smith v. Allwright held that 
blacks could not be excluded from the Texas Democratic primary.64  Virginia 
similarly gave certain preferences in its general elections to nominees from the 
party conventions.65  Whether or not the advantage was significant, the 
delegation of power closely resembled the kind of evasive maneuvering that 
pre-clearance sought to remedy.  Significantly, the Court found legislative 
comments suggesting that coverage was appropriate in this very same 
context.66  Congress appeared to understand the linkage between parties and 
elections by drafting Section 14 of the Act, which defined “voting” to include 
the “selection of party officers.”67 
2. What Changes Are Reviewable? 
Just as Congress and the Court have construed the geographical reach of 
pre-clearance expansively, they have also required states to submit a broad set 
of proposed laws for federal review.  Compared to the triggering formula in the 
statute, the applicable text is not as clear about what types of law must be 
submitted.  Section Five states that new “standard[s], practice[s], or 
procedure[s] with respect to voting” are reviewable.  As this language has been 
construed by Congress and the Court, the submission requirement applies to an 
especially large number of state enactments.  Very few limitations to this rather 
broad conception of the remedy’s subject matter have been recognized.  On the 
whole, then, there has been very little question that the federal oversight 
system applies to several categories of state enactments. 
 
 60. Morse v. Republican Party of Virginia, 517 U.S. 186, 205 (1996). 
 61. Id. at 190. 
 62. Id. at 199 (“In concluding that the regulation applies to the Party, we are guided by the 
reasoning of Smith v. Allwright,, decided more than half a century ago.”); see also Terry v. 
Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (holding that the Texas Jaybird party was subject to the Fifteenth 
Amendment); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (outlawing the racially selective white 
primary); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (invalidating a Texas statute that denied blacks 
the ability to participate in Democratic primaries). 
 63. Smith, 321 U.S. at 664–65. 
 64. Id. at 666. 
 65. Morse, 517 U.S. at 186–87. 
 66. Id. at 188. 
 67. Id. at 203–04. 
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The broad judicial conception of the submission requirement was apparent 
in the first Supreme Court case describing the types of changes subject to 
federal review in the VRA.68  The plaintiffs in Allen v. State Board of Elections 
challenged several rules that states had enacted without federal review.69  
While all related to political participation, only one of these rules directly 
affected registration and balloting.  Nevertheless, the Court required review in 
each instance because the pre-clearance remedy enjoyed “the widest possible 
scope” in its application.70  The Court explained its position based upon the 
reasoning from Katzenbach: 
We must reject the narrow construction . . . to Section Five.  The Voting 
Rights Act was aimed at subtle, as well as obvious, state regulations which 
have the effect of denying citizens their right to vote because of their race.  
Moreover, . . . the Act gives a broad interpretation of the right to vote, 
recognizing that voting includes “all action necessary to make a vote 
effective.71 
State laws bearing even the potential to do harm to the franchise even “in a 
minor way” were reviewable “changes” in the pre-clearance regime.72  By 
defining the franchise quite broadly, the Court established that a large number 
of state laws would be closely regulated pursuant to the submission 
requirement. 
Congress ratified this judicial construction by extending Section Five of 
the VRA  in 1970.73  Due to pre-clearance enforcement, registration and 
turnout rates all had significantly improved voter participation in the originally 
covered states.74  However, advocates of a statutory extension concluded that 
these states needed more progress.  In particular, Congress noted that vote 
dilution continued to limit the effectiveness of votes that were actually cast.75  
Dilution did not prevent a citizen from registering or casting a ballot, but it 
minimized the impact of that vote on electoral outcomes.76  Legislators relied 
upon the broad conception of the pre-clearance remedy in Allen as authority 
for modifying Section Five to address these more subtle and sophisticated 
manipulations of the electoral system.77 
 
 68. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 572 (1969). 
 69. Id. at 550. 
 70. Id. at 566–67. 
 71. Id. at 565. 
 72. Id. at 566. 
 73. Voting Rights Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-284, 84 Stat. 314 (1970). 
 74. Joint View, supra note 37, at 5520. 
 75. See id. at 5520–21. 
 76. See id. at 5520. 
 77. Id. 5521. 
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The Court’s endorsement of the 1970 amendment was apparent in two 
particular decisions—Perkins v. Matthews and Georgia v. United States.78  In 
both, the legislative hearings provided support for extending federal review to 
changes with the potential to dilute the right to vote.  In Perkins, for instance, 
the shift in focus led the Court to find that an annexation proposal in 
Mississippi was subject to federal review.79  The majority in that case 
explained that a racially selective policy could abridge the franchise in two 
ways.  First, local officials could decide to annex only those outlying 
communities where whites lived.80  Second, a racially selective annexation 
would mean that votes in black communities already in the jurisdiction might 
be diluted.81  Thus, the Court acknowledged the probability of vote dilution 
along with that of outright denial as circumstances that create a pre-clearance 
violation.82 
Likewise, in Georgia, the Court invoked this rationale in rejecting a 
proposal to redraw election districts.83  Georgia had not submitted a new 
election district plan to federal authorities, and the state sought review on 
whether a pre-clearance submission was even necessary for redistricting.84  
Turning again to the 1970 legislative record, the Court found that district 
drawing was one of the “standards, practices, or procedures with respect to 
voting” included in Section Five.85  Redistricting could dilute votes by shifting 
district lines to “pack” minority voters into a single district or to “crack” large 
concentrations of these voters.86  Significant in this analysis was the 
observation that none of the legislative changes conflicted with the view taken 
in Allen that all policies with the potential to affect the right to vote are 
reviewable.87  This point was further confirmed by the reliance upon the Allen 
decision by legislators who sponsored the 1970 extension: “We can only 
conclude then that Allen correctly interpreted the congressional design when it 
held that “the Act gives a broad interpretation of the right to vote, recognizing 
 
 78. Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973); Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 
(1971). 
 79. Perkins, 400 U.S. at 390–92. 
 80. Id. at 388. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 388–89. 
 83. Georgia, , 411 U.S. at 532–34. 
 84. Id. at 527–28. 
 85. Id. at 532. 
 86. Jamal Greene, Judging Partisan Gerrymanders Under the Elections Clause, 114 YALE 
L.J. 1021, 1041 (2005). 
 87. Georgia, 411 U.S. at 534 (“In the present posture of this case, the question is not 
whether the redistricting of the Georgia House, including extensive shifts from single-member to 
multimember districts, in fact had a racially discriminatory purpose or effect.  The question, 
rather, is whether such changes have the potential for diluting the value of the Negro vote and are 
within the definitional terms of § 5. It is beyond doubt that such a potential exists.”). 
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that voting includes ‘all action necessary to make a vote effective.’”88  
Applying pre-clearance review in this context was perhaps a stretch, but the 
legislative endorsement provided the justification.  Congress recognized that 
state compliance with the one person-one vote principle would require a 
regular pre-clearance submission of redistricting plans. 
McDaniel v. Sanchez found review appropriate for an election plan 
adopted in federal court that embodied the “policy choices of [its] elected 
representatives.”89  In doing so, the Court refused to create an exception to the 
submission requirement where a federal court orders a “change.”90  The local 
jurisdiction had altered its election system to resolve a one-person-one-vote 
violation noted in a federal court’s findings.91  The remedy ultimately was part 
of the court’s final order, but the details of the plan were developed and 
approved by local officials.92  Over the objections of the plaintiffs in the case, 
the judge enacted the plan without pre-clearance review.93  The jurisdiction 
characterized the change as a federal court plan, which was not subject to the 
submission requirement.94  But, the Court rejected this claim, finding that a 
“covered’ jurisdiction was actually responsible for the new plan.95  Even 
though the court may have limited its options, the county was responsible for 
the plan’s details.  Additionally, the Court found evidence in the 1975 
legislative record weighing in favor of requiring review.  The congressional 
committee that drafted the extension expected that federal oversight would 
apply in one-person-one-vote cases like these.96 
In other cases, the Court pushed the bounds of the submission requirement 
even farther.  The “change” in Dougherty County v. White was an 
administrative rule denying pay to state employees who ran for public office.97  
The Court stated that this rule was a “standard, practice, or procedure” because 
of the context in which this rule was adopted and because of its potential 
effects on voting.98  The rule was implemented shortly after a black employee 
had announced his candidacy for the state legislature.99  The odd timing cast 
some doubt on the asserted reason for the rule—maintaining the sound 
management of public funds.  Since the rule targeted only employees engaged 
 
 88. Id. at 533. 
 89. 452 U.S. 130 (1981). 
 90. Id. at 148–49. 
 91. Id. at 133–34. 
 92. Id. at 134–35. 
 93. Id. at 135. 
 94. Id. at 138. 
 95. McDaniel, 452 U.S. at 153. 
 96. Id. at 148, n.26 (citing S. REP. NO. 94-295, at 17–18 (1975)). 
 97. Dougherty County, Ga., Bd. of Educ. v. White, 439 U.S. 32, 34 (1978). 
 98. Id. at 42–43. 
 99. Id. at 34. 
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in election activity, the intent to change the voting system was simple for the 
Court to see.100  In addition, the Court identified two specific ways that 
withholding salary in these circumstances could adversely affect minority 
voters.  First, the rule created an economic disincentive against candidates 
pursuing public office.101  Similarly, with fewer candidates on the ballot, the 
rule would narrow the choices available to the electorate.102  Its likely effects, 
similar to the changes considered in Allen, were sufficiently related to the 
franchise for review.103  The Court’s expansive construction seemed to apply 
federal review even to more typical administrative rules. 
In McCain v. Lybrand, the Court held that the submission requirement was 
not open to exceptions based on administrative expediency.104  South Carolina 
advanced a rather novel claim that the Attorney General had “implicitly” 
approved several laws passed in 1966.105  These voting-related enactments 
were enforced without a formal federal review, but the state argued the 
changes were part of a later filing that the DOJ had approved.106  The Court did 
not accept this excuse and enjoined the 1966 laws.107  Of course, there were 
practical reasons to have taken the opposite position.  In all likelihood, the DOJ 
was aware of the 1966 laws when it reviewed the “omnibus” submission.  
Additionally, showing lenience in this case might have avoided the 
administrative problem of parsing out the elements of South Carolina’s 
election system that remained valid.  But the Court once again opted for the 
more robust version of the submission requirement.108  The law required that 
each “change” undergo an analysis of its purpose and possible effects prior to 
its implementation.  Ignoring this omission would have interfered with the 
entire pre-clearance system.109  To be effective, the remedy depended upon full 
state compliance.  While the text of the statute did not clearly provide an 
answer, the Court read the Act to counsel against easing submission burdens 
on covered jurisdictions.110 
Not until Presley v. Etowah County did the Court present a categorical 
limitation on the “changes” subject to federal review.111  There, the Court held 
that matters involving governance were beyond the types of vote-related rules 
 
 100. Id. at 40. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Dougherty County, 439 U.S. at 43. 
 104. McCain v. Lybrand, 465 U.S. 236, 246–47 (1984). 
 105. Brief of Appellee at 33–35, McCain v. Lybrand, No. 82-282 (Sept. 8, 1983). 
 106. Id. at 16–17. 
 107. McCain, 465 U.S. at 239. 
 108. Id. at 249. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 257. 
 111. Presley v. Etowah County Comm’n, 502 U.S. 491, 503 (1992). 
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that are subject to federal review.112  One of the county governments in this 
case had settled a Section Two dilution lawsuit by adopting a single-member 
plan with a majority-black district.113  Voters from that district chose a black 
candidate in the resulting elections, but the incumbent commissioners 
undermined his authority by stripping these offices of independent power.114  
Each member traditionally could decide budget and policy matters in his home 
district.  But the new rule made these choices subject to a majority vote 
requirement, effectively isolating the lone black member.115  Even though the 
design of the new system bore suspicious timing and effects, the Court found 
that review was not required for this decision because it concerned 
“governance” as opposed to voting.116 
The logic in Dougherty County seemed to suggest that this reshuffling of 
political power was a reviewable “change.”  For one thing, the procedure 
posed significant problems for minority candidates and their constituencies.  
Voters expected their representative to enjoy certain independent powers that 
were suddenly modified after the election.117  The racially charged atmosphere 
that led to the lawsuit and settlement made consensus building particularly 
unlikely.  In addition, the context around the Commission’s sudden decision to 
alter its structure seemed equally peculiar.  Like Dougherty County, the facts in 
Etowah County indicated that race may have played a role in the sudden policy 
shift.  But, the Court found that pre-clearance did not apply because the vote 
did not “bear a direct relation to voting itself.”118 
Presley appears to cut against the otherwise expansive trend in this area, 
since the majority enumerates measures that are subject to the submission 
requirement.  Prior to this point, the Court had been reluctant to describe any 
such limits to avoid giving states latitude to evade the law.  Under this rule, 
though, no proposed law is subject to review unless it has a direct connection 
to voting or to elections.119  One could read this opinion as the beginning of a 
judicial effort to narrow the submission rule from the seemingly boundless 
version in Allen.  Congress had not specifically addressed this provision since 
1970, so the Court could have imposed its own interpretation.  On the other 
hand, the majority emphasized that its holding only summarized the rule had 
 
 112. Id. at 506. 
 113. Id. at 522, n.23 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 114. Id. at 496–97. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Presley, 502 U.S. at 507.  The changes were made “less than nine months after the 
county’s first black commissioner took office, were an obvious response to the redistricting of the 
county that produced a majority black district from which a black commissioner was elected.”  Id. 
at 521–22 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 117. See id. at 503–04 (majority opinion). 
 118. Id. at 510. 
 119. Id. 
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been applied in the past.120  To the extent that the majority meant what it said, 
Presley did not purport to disturb the main point of Allen—that pre-clearance 
deserved an application of the widest scope. 
B. The Legal Standard for Pre-clearance Review 
As opposed to questions about where and when pre-clearance applies, 
questions about the review standard have been subject to a much more 
contested interpretive history.  The substantive heart of the remedy is its test 
for examining state voting changes.  According to the statute, a violation exists 
if the proposed change in law “has . . . the purpose [or] the effect of denying or 
abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.”121  The standard clearly 
calls attention to the jurisdiction’s intent along with its potential effects on 
minority voters, and importantly, the standard places the burden of proof on 
the covered jurisdiction.122  Thus, a proposed change is invalid and 
unenforceable in a covered state without affirmative evidence that its purpose 
and effect does not “deny or abridge” the right to vote. 
But, the statutory language is only as effective as its interpretation.  The 
evolution of this feature has been almost exclusively controlled by the 
judiciary.  Until the most recent renewal efforts, Congress has rarely acted to 
announce its preferred view of this part of the remedy.  In the absence of clear 
legislative efforts, the Court has introduced novel concepts that severely limit 
federal review to a single issue—retrogression.  As a result, the meaning of the 
pre-clearance standard has become relatively less clear and less predictable 
than the other parts of the remedy. 
1. Retrogression as a Concept 
The way the Court has interpreted the standard for reviewing proposals is 
most evident in Beer v. United States, a 1976 decision upholding election 
districts in New Orleans.123  Focusing on the plan’s likely effects, the Court 
reversed a trial finding that the proposed map violated the pre-clearance 
standard.124  As the Court redefined the test, pre-clearance did not prohibit a 
new proposal unless its effects were “retrogressive”—i.e., they reduced a 
 
 120. Id. at 501 (“We agree that all changes in voting must be pre-cleared and with Allen’s 
holding that the scope of Section Five is expansive within the sphere of its operation.”). 
 121. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (2000). 
 122. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328 (1966). According to the Court, 
Congress intended to shift the advantages of time away from the offending states and to the 
federal government in these proceedings.  Id. 
 123. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 142 (1976).  There, black residents were about half 
of the city's population in 1970, but local officials crafted only one single member district with a 
population approaching a majority of voting age blacks.  Id. at 134–35. 
 124. Id. at 136, 142. 
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minority group’s pre-existing level of voting strength.125  Even though the one 
redrawn district with a sizable black population was less than a majority, the 
change was deemed “ameliorative” in the sense that blacks were marginally 
better off than before the change.126 
This construction seriously limited the remedy’s reach, especially in places 
where racial discrimination was most severe.  Pre-clearance would do very 
little work where black political representation was most depressed.  In New 
Orleans, for example, local officials satisfied the standard by adopting a 
minimal increase in representation.127  While it might have been an easy rule 
for courts to apply in practice, the rule of retrogression was a less robust 
protection than even the Justice Department had anticipated.128  Furthermore, 
this analysis suggested by the Supreme Court ignored contextual evidence of 
existing race discrimination.  Retrogression effectively reduced the review to a 
quasi-quantitative assessment of the political strength of minorities. 
For all its faults, the advantage of Beer was in its predictability.  However, 
the Court established several exceptions to this rule in later cases.  The justices 
recognized an “ex necessitate” exception for local annexations.129  In City of 
Richmond v. United States, the Court approved an annexation that tipped a 
city’s racial balance in favor of white voters.130  Proof of retrogressive effects 
was undeniable using Beer, since the black percentage of the population would 
significantly diminish.131  Yet the annexation plan was deemed permissible, 
despite these effects, because it “fairly reflected” black political power.132 
So what was the legislative response to this somewhat novel reformulation 
of the pre-clearance standard?  Evidence from the legislative record developed 
in 1982 suggests that the reaction was not mere acquiescence.133  Indeed, the 
lack of a more concerted response is largely explained by timing.  The Court 
announced its decision in Beer just one year after the 1975 legislative 
amendments to the VRA, which mainly left the administrative standard of 
review unchanged.  Likewise, the Court’s refinement of the review standard in 
 
 125. Id. at 141.  Compared to the earlier district map which had carefully avoided black 
majorities, the proposed plan under review slightly increased the percentage of blacks in one 
district.  Id. at 141–42. 
 126. Id. at 141. 
 127. See id. at 150–52, n.7 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 128. Drew Days, Section 5 Enforcement and the Department of Justice, in CONTROVERSIES 
IN MINORITY VOTING (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1992). 
 129. See Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 330 (2000). 
 130. City of Richmond Heights v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 371–72 (1975). 
 131. See id. at 363 (noting that the percentage of blacks would decline from 52% to 42%). 
 132. Id. at 371. 
 133. See infra Part II.B.2. 
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City of Richmond did not lead to a specific response from Congress.134  Each of 
the Court’s decisions in this area came on the heels of a legislative revision of 
the pre-clearance provisions, which primarily focused on expanding the 
remedy in other ways.  In addition, the renewals included sunset provisions 
intended in part to settle matters for a prescribed period of time.  With so much 
effort to craft a renewal, there was little interest in revisiting the matter to 
address the Court’s view of the standard—even one that seemed in conflict 
with other parts of the Act. 
2. The Short-Lived Notion of Incorporation 
But Congress did have an opportunity to react to the retrogression principle 
in 1982.  The catalyzing event for the legislative action was a Supreme Court 
case holding that Section Two of the VRA only outlawed intentional 
discrimination135—a position that many believe was inconsistent with the 
original intent of the 1965 statute.136  Sponsors in Congress therefore pushed 
for specific changes in the statutory text to make clear that either a 
discriminatory purpose or a disparate effect would violate the law in most 
cases.137  Even though most of the legislative proceedings focused on the 
language and application of Section Two’s application in vote dilution cases, 
there is significant evidence in the record showing that legislators believed that 
these modifications would at least indirectly encourage a less restrictive 
understanding of the pre-clearance standard.138 
During the hearings on the amendments, committee reports adopted in both 
chambers endorsed the idea that a pre-clearance objection was appropriate 
anytime a proposed change in law violated the Constitution or Section Two of 
the Voting Rights Act.139  This conception of the remedy imposes a more 
exacting standard of the review standard than Beer suggests, since it adds an 
additional level of analysis.  Even some non-retrogressive proposals might still 
fail under a standard that examines whether a plan whose results are racially 
dilutive.  In other words, a new plan might fail if its adoption would lead to a 
lawsuit under Section Two.  To be sure, the statements from the floor debates 
are entirely uniform in their endorsement of this incorporation theory, which is 
at least partially due to the need for compromise in a divided government.140  
Nevertheless, the theory described in these reports indicates that Congress 
 
 134. Thomas R. Morris & Neil Bradley, Virginia, in QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH  271 
(Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman 1994). 
 135. City of Mobile, Ala. v. Bolden, 465 U.S. 55, 61 (1980). 
 136. See S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 17 (1982). 
 137. Id. at 27–29. 
 138. H.R. REP. NO. 97-227, at 34–35 (1982); see also 128 CONG. REC. 14,312-13 (June 18, 
1982). 
 139. H.R. REP. 97-227, at 33 (1981); S. REP. NO. 97-417 (1981). 
 140. See generally, H.R. REP. 97-227, (1981); S. REP. NO. 97-417 (1981). 
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might not have simply accepted or endorsed the Court’s formulation of the 
standard in Beer.141 
Whether or not Congress intended to incorporate Section Two analysis into 
the pre-clearance standard in 1982, the Supreme Court summarily rejected this 
approach in its later cases.  Holding to its Beer formulation, the majority has 
explained that the VRA’s provisions embody distinct functions that require 
different approaches.142  Where Section Five is concerned, retrogression 
analysis remains the controlling inquiry. 
The Court emphasized this functional distinction in Holder v. Hall, where 
it dismissed a Section Two lawsuit to increase the size of a governing body.143  
Minority voters tried to analogize their claim to the pre-clearance review, 
which applied to the size of a jurisdiction.144  The Court rejected this approach 
because there was no reasoned basis of comparison.  Review under Section 
Two requires comparing the challenged system to an ideal one.145  But Section 
Five’s standard review only requires an analysis of the current system and the 
proposed change.146 
The Court formally discarded the idea of incorporation in the first review 
of Reno v. Bossier Parish.147  There, the DOJ had objected to a school district 
plan because of a likely violation of Section Two.148  The majority first 
remanded and later upheld the plan, finding that the DOJ had exceeded its 
power under the pre-clearance provision.149  Noting the various procedural 
distinctions in the review process, the Court concluded that the Section Five 
inquiry was designed to be limited.150  While relevant to a pre-clearance 
inquiry, evidence of vote dilution (a concern under Section Two) cannot itself 
provide the basis for finding a violation under the standard 
3. The Racial Gerrymandering Cases 
The Court’s narrow approach is also evident in its racial gerrymandering 
cases, which outlaw district drawing that it is predominantly motivated by 
race.151  The majority’s analysis focused on the 14th Amendment, but these 
 
 141. See generally, H.R. REP. 97-227, (1981); S. REP. NO. 97-417 (1981). 
 142. See Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 336 (2000). 
 143. Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 885 (1994). 
 144. Id. at 882. 
 145. Id. at 880. 
 146. Id. at 883. 
 147. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. at 339–40. 
 148. Id. at 475. 
 149. Id. at 490; see Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. at 339–40. 
 150. See Bossier Parish, 528 U.S. at 329, 335. 
 151. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643–44 
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cases just as strongly rely upon its adherence to the retrogression principle.152  
The states in these cases had drawn multiple black-majority districts partly to 
avoid a threatened pre-clearance objection.153  The Court acknowledged that 
complying with the VRA was a compelling state interest, but such compliance 
did not require maximizing the number of black-majority districts.154  Put 
another way, the DOJ was not allowed to use its pre-clearance power to force 
states to adopt a specific number of majority-black districts.  In Miller v. 
Johnson, for instance, the DOJ had no reason to encourage Georgia to draw 
more than the two majority black districts in its original plan.155  The state’s 
earlier plan was not retrogressive, the Court implied, because it featured one 
more of these districts than the state had in 1980.156 
The aforementioned cases all applied the retrogression test in cases 
involving likely alleged discriminatory effects.  The Court has also employed 
retrogression to analyze plans that might violate the pre-clearance standard due 
to a discriminatory purpose.  Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board (Reno II) 
upheld a school board plan even though local officials openly refused to draw 
even one majority-black district to help accommodate its thirty percent black 
population.157 
Reasoning from Beer, Justice Scalia claimed that applying the principle 
parallel construction of statutes mandated this outcome.158  The “purposes” 
prohibited in the provision had to be identical to the kind of “effects” that were 
barred—meaning only retrogressive ones.159  Thus, a jurisdiction’s goal of 
renewing its existing plan—even an unconstitutional one—did not violate the 
review standard.160  Although it took great pains to harmonize this 
interpretation with other prior holdings, the majority did not appeal to the 
legislative hearings to support its position.161  As in Beer, the jurisdiction’s 
poor history of minority representation immunized its changes from close 
review.162  In sharp contrast to the vigorous enforcement scheme suggested by 
 
 152. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 983 (1996) (There, the Court made clear that 
nonretrogression simply required “that the minority’s opportunity to elect representatives of its 
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 153. See e.g., Miller, 515 U.S. at 906-07; Shaw, 509 U.S. at 651. 
 154. Miller, 515 U.S. at 910. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 923. 
 157. See Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 323, 326, 341 (2000). 
 158. Id. at 336. 
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 160. Id. at 336. 
 161. Rather, the Court justified its position based on the structural claim that sections 2 and 5 
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(Souter, J., dissenting). 
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Allen, this holding requires the federal reviewer to overlook violations of 
Section Two or even the Constitution itself. 
4. Retrogression Redux 
The campaign to rein in pre-clearance review by judicial interpretation 
reached new heights in Georgia v. Ashcroft, whose holding only purported to 
define the “effective exercise of the franchise.”163  In fact, the Court relaxed 
the pre-clearance standard to the point that dissenters in the case wondered 
whether anything was left of the review standard.164  Under this latest gloss on 
retrogression, states can intentionally eliminate existing majority-minority 
districts without causing a violation.  That is, the Court endorsed a change that 
clearly reduces existing minority voting strength (which seemed exactly what 
retrogression says is barred).165 
The district court reviewed the plan in question and denied pre-clearance, 
primarily because the state had substituted black majorities with “influence” 
districts.166  The new districts contained fewer blacks than their predecessors, 
and they were located in different parts of the state.  The panel also pointed out 
that even if blacks enjoyed an “equal opportunity to elect” candidates overall 
(as Georgia’s evidence arguably showed), the plan was retrogressive because 
fewer seats were under the control of black voters than was true under the old 
plan.167 
The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court had misapplied the 
retrogression standard.168  The correct inquiry was whether Georgia had 
retrogressed in the totality of circumstances.169  This time, the majority’s 
reasoning rested neither on an analysis of the statutory text nor on Congress’ 
intent but on a political theory.170  While not the same as controlling elections, 
political influence can be an important alternative basis of political 
representation for minority groups.171  For this reason, a court should not 
discount or ignore the benefits gained from districts with less than a black 
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majority.172  In the majority’s view, the new plan likely complied with Section 
Five.173 
III.  DISCUSSION 
The preceding sections have made the case that interpreting the pre-
clearance remedy has not been uniformly expansive.  Contrary to the view of 
some critics, the evolution of this provision has been more complicated.  
Whereas some features of the remedy have been construed in an expansive 
manner, the central part of the remedy—the standard of review—has followed 
a very different trajectory.  The federal judiciary has consistently employed a 
narrow interpretation of this standard to outlaw only a small subset of 
discriminatory state practices.  Unlike the construction of the first two features, 
the substantive test for pre-clearance violation has not involved the kind of 
mutual reinforcement that would entrench a clear meaning.  Either due to 
Congress’ purposeful ambiguity or its insufficient action, the courts have 
remained dominant in shaping the provision, and their view has been decidedly 
narrow compared to the way the other parts of the remedy have been read. 
This section places these observations in context, relying on the interactive 
theory of statutory construction discussed earlier.  At its core, the judiciary’s 
role in shaping the standard of review is explainable by the role that this 
feature plays in the VRA along with the court’s strategic considerations about 
how Congress might react to its retrogression principle. 
The judicial emphasis on controlling the standard of review is not 
especially surprising given the nature of the provision.  The process of 
assessing a pre-clearance violation closely resembles the kind of adjudication 
that the judges employ in common law cases.  Courts have a comparative 
advantage over legislatures in developing the kinds of tests applied in a variety 
of circumstances.  Unlike legislatures, the courts are also able to refashion 
these tests in light of new observations.  The expertise in elaborating on an 
existing standard partly explains the judiciary’s more active role in construing 
this part of the statute. 
However, this trend is also explainable by the court’s strategic 
considerations in advancing its construction of the review standard.  The key 
moment in the development of this standard was when the judiciary adopted 
the retrogression principle in Beer.174  Nothing in the previous legislative 
enactments of the VRA, either the legislative history or the statutory text, 
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of black state legislators who supported this plan.  The Court found that their opinions were 
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indicated that Congress anticipated such a narrow construction.175  But the 
judiciary found that the interpretive choice was compatible with its own sense 
of how pre-clearance ought to work in practice.  If Congress favored a broader 
conception for the provision, then they had the authority to enact it. 
Ironically, Congress did not remain entirely silent on whether this 
interpretation of the provision was correct.  While it did not address the 
retrogression issue with new statutory language that rejected the prior 
interpretation, the legislative record from 1982 supported a broader view of the 
standard than Beer described.176  Of course, the statements from legislative 
committee reports were not the same as new statutory text.  Thus, this kind of 
evidence would only be persuasive to a judiciary willing to cede their preferred 
interpretation to a less robust display of legislative intent.  Their reaction was 
to maintain (and, at times, expand) the retrogression analysis in later cases.  
Aside from carving out narrow exceptions to the principle in selected cases, the 
Court employed the retrogression test to deny or limit pre-clearance 
enforcement in redistricting cases as well as discriminatory intent cases. 
Without a contrary view expressed in the form of a statutory override of 
Beer, the judiciary found no basis to depart from its conception of the pre-
clearance standard.  The Court might be criticized for failing to weigh the 1982 
congressional committee findings more seriously in their analysis, but their 
decision is not without foundation.  Congress clearly did adopt new statutory 
language to override a contrary judicial construction of Section Two of the Act 
in the renewal,177 making the absence of similar changes in reaction to Beer 
much more meaningful.  By signaling its inability or unwillingness to commit 
to a particular view of the remedy, the Court had no incentive to alter their 
approach to the provision.  Consequently, the judiciary relied far less on text 
and the legislative history in analyzing future cases.  Instead, the Court spent 
much more energy on assuring that its decisions would remain compatible with 
their own view of the standard. 
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